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The Effects of Managerial Turnover: Evidence from  
Coach Dismissals in Italian Soccer Teams 
 
Abstract. In this paper sport data are used to study the effects of manager replacement on 
firm performance. Using match results of the major Italian soccer league (“Serie A”) we 
analyze the effects of coach (manager) changes in terms of team performance. From our 
preliminary estimates, including year and team fixed effects, it emerges that changing the 
coach produces a positive effect on a number of measures of team performance. However, 
this effect turns out to be statistically insignificant once we take into account the fact that 
the firing of a coach is not an exogenous event, but it is triggered by a “dip” in team 
performance. Using as an instrument for coach change the number of remaining matches in 
the season (which is a proxy for the residual length of the coach contract) Two-Stages 
Least Squares estimations do not show any significant effect of coach change on team 
performance. 
 
JEL Classification: J63; M50; M54; L83. 
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1. Introduction 
Data on sports have been used in a large and increasing number of fruitful researches. Thanks to 
the availability of detailed and reliable measures of performance and data on individual careers, 
they are mostly employed to analyze issues related to incentives and labour market outcomes. 
An interesting topic, already considered using sport data, is the tendency of firms and 
organizations to replace their managers in order to try to improve their performance. In this 
paper we analyze the effects of changing the coach on team performance using match level data 
from the major Italian soccer league “Serie A” for the five seasons between 2003-2004 to 2007-
2008. 
The use of soccer data to infer the effects of the impact of manager dismissal in firms 
presents some relevant advantages since outcomes are measured directly on a weekly basis and 
do not suffer from serious measurement problems. On the other hand, data on firm performance 
are usually collected on a yearly basis and to measure the effects of manager turnover 
researchers compare results in years prior to the dismissal with results obtained after the 
dismissal. However, during this time period other things tend to change as well. To avoid this 
problem in some works firm stock prices are considered as indicators of firm performance. 
Stock prices are available on a daily basis, but unfortunately they are strongly influenced by 
expectations and are related more on what markets believe about the effect of manager turnover 
than on the actual effect it produces on firm performance. 
As a top manager in a firm, the coach represents a crucial subject for the management of 
soccer clubs, since he undertakes a number of strategic and operative decisions which affect the 
 2
team performance. The coach trains and motivates players, selects players for each match, 
decides the tactics and game strategies of the team, etc.  
Due to the crucial role of the coach for team performance, it is quite a common 
occurrence in soccer his replacement in case of negative results. From a theoretical point of 
view, coach dismissal might have different effects on team performance. On the one hand, the 
new coach may be able to motivate the players better, for example he may not take into account 
past positions in defining team composition and, as a consequence, the players have to provide a 
higher effort in order to be selected for the next game. On the other hand, coach dismissals may 
be the result of fan and media pressure, which does not generally consider that replacement 
destroys information accumulated by the ousted coach (Hoffler and Sliwka, 2003).   
Testing empirically in a rigorous way these countervailing forces and understanding 
whether firing the coach helps to improve team outcomes is difficult because it is unknown 
what would have happened if the old coach had led the team.  
Two thorny econometric problems need to be addressed when trying to disentangle the 
effects of coach turnover on team performance: 1) during a season a team plays against different 
opponents and therefore old and new coaches face different conditions: in order to obtain 
reliable estimates it is necessary to control for opponents quality; 2) coaches are not randomly 
fired: in fact, a dismissal is typically decided after a number of consecutive negative results. 
Since in a stochastic environment, unusually low or unusually high outcomes are statistically 
followed by outcomes that tend to be closer to the mean (“regression to the mean”), naïve 
analysis, which do not control for this aspect, may erroneously conclude that coach forced 
turnover leads to an improvement in team performance even if its real effect is negligible. 
Similar problems, probably even worst, are met when analyzing firm performance and 
manager turnover. In fact, also in this case managers are not randomly fired and after and before 
firing a number of unobservable factors, which affect firm performance for reasons unrelated to 
the managerial turnover, tend to change. 
Probably because of these econometric problems, the literature on the effects of 
manager turnover on organizational performance does not find univocal results. The business 
literature shows mixed results, but on balance these studies suggest small positive effects of 
managerial turnover on firm performance. Bonnier and Bruner (1989) and Weisbach (1988) 
observe significantly positive stock price reactions to turnover news. On the other hand, Khanna 
and Poulsen (1995) find the opposite result. Reinganum (1985) and Warner, Watts and Wruck, 
(1988) report small, statistically insignificant, price changes associated with turnover events. 
Other works examine the relation between turnover and changes in operating performance 
measured using accounting information. Denis and Denis (1995) show that forced resignation of 
top managers are followed by large improvements in firm performance.  Similar results are 
found by Khurana and Nohria (2000). More recently, Huson, Malatesta and Parino (2004) show 
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that turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive stock returns and are 
positively related to accounting measures of performance.  
Similarly, studies based on sport data do not find univocal results of the effects of coach  
turnover on team performance. Some studies found evidence that turnover improves team 
performance (Fabianic, 1994; McTeer et al., 1995), while others did not find any significant 
effect (Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel, 2003, Koning, 2002; Maximiano, 2006). Other works found 
instead a negative impact (Brown 1982; Salomo and Teichmann, 2000; Audas et al., 2002; 
Audas et al. 2006).  
It is worthwhile to notice that earlier analyses on coach turnover are based on simple 
models, which do not consider the serious econometric problems discussed above.  
In comparison to the previous literature our paper introduces some innovations. Firstly, 
we use an instrumental variable approach, to tackle the problem of endogeneity in coach 
turnover; secondly, we control for opponents’ quality considering teams’ ranking position in the 
past season or points accumulated until the considered round; finally, our study is the first 
focusing on Italian “Serie A”, one of the most important championships in the world in terms of 
revenues produced, stadium attendance, supporters’ interest, media coverage, etc.  
We start estimating a model of team performance, measured using different indicators, 
controlling for opponents’ quality and including team and season fixed effects. From the 
estimates of the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating a coach change within the season, it 
emerges that changing the coach produces a positive effect on team performance.  
Subsequently, we test whether these results are robust once problems that may derive 
from the fact that firing the coach is not a random event are handled. We use as an instrument 
for coach change the number of remaining matches in the season. This variable affects the cost 
of coach change, since typically dismissed coach has to be paid by the club for the remaining 
part of the season: therefore, the number of remaining matches negatively affects the probability 
of coach change. On the other hand, the number of remaining matches should not affect directly 
team performance (for reasons unrelated to coach change). 
Interestingly, from Two-Stage Least Squares estimates it emerges that coach 
replacement does not produce any significant effect on team performance. These results lead us 
to conclude that the positive effects of coach change that emerge in LSDV estimations are a 
result of the “Ashenfelter dip phenomenon”.1 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the most salient features 
of the data and a number of descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents fixed effects estimates, and 
                                                     
1 The “Ashenfelter dip phenomenon” was originally noted by Ashenfelter (1978) in relation to the fact 
that the earnings of participants to training programs tend to decline just before they enter in these 
programs. Therefore, the comparison of earnings before and after training will tend to overestimate the 
effects of the program. 
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in Section 4 we carry out instrumental variables estimates of the effects of coach turnover on 
team performance. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics  
We use a dataset with information at match level of 5 seasons of the major Italian soccer league 
“Serie A” (starting from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008). Data were collected from the websites of 
Wikipedia and RAI Sport (http://www.raisport.rai.it/).  
The Italian “Serie A” was composed by 20 teams in each season, except in 2003–2004 
in which there were 18 teams. In each season, teams played each other twice (both as the home 
and visiting team) for a total of 38 matches (34 in 2003-04).2 Therefore, there have been 1826 
matches, yielding a total number of 3652 observations of team performance. For each match we 
have available data on teams, their respective coaches, goals scored, the place and the date when 
each game was played. Furthermore, we know the date when a coach has been replaced during 
the season, the total points obtained by teams before each round, the positions of teams in the 
final ranking of each season. 
As regards coach changes, we consider only changes of coaches taking place within the 
season, because replacements between seasons do not allow us to distinguish between effects 
due to the coach change from other factors related to a different composition and quality of the 
team or of its opponents. In fact, teams are subject to a considerable renewal between seasons 
through an intense exchange of players and, in addition, the composition of the league changes 
because the three lowest placed teams are relegated into a lower division, “Serie B”, and the 
three best placed teams of “Serie B” are promoted into “Serie A”. 
Coach dismissals are a quite frequent phenomenon in soccer. In our dataset, on average 
41% of teams have changed the coach during a given season. There were 5 replacements in 
2003-04; 9 in 2004-05; 8 in 2005-06; 9 in 2006-07 and 9 in 2007-08. A total of 23% of matches 
were played by teams managed by a new coach. Coach change is more frequent among low-
performing teams (67% of lowest placed ten teams fired the coach) and rare among high-
performing ones (only 16% of first-ranked ten teams replaced the coach).  
From media coverage, we know that almost all the coach replacements are initiated by 
the management of the club and, even in the few cases of coach resignations, these have been 
provoked by the discontent of the board. Therefore, we do not distinguish between replacements 
and resignations. 
Team performance is measured using different indicators of the outcome obtained on 
the pitch: the number of points gained in each match by the team (Points), the number of Goals 
                                                     
2 In the first half of the season each team will play one time against all its opponents, while in the second 
half each team plays in the exact same order against the same teams, but a home game played in the first 
half will be an away game in the second half, and vice versa. 
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Scored, the number of Goals Conceded and the Score Difference (equal to the Goals Scored 
minus the Goals Conceded). According to the rule of soccer, teams are awarded 3 points if they 
win a game, 1 point in case of draw and 0 points if they lose. The sum of points obtained in each 
game determines the final ranking. 
As it is possible to see in Table 1 – considering only teams that changed the coach 
within a season – on average the new coach earns more points with respect to the old coach. 
Furthermore, on average the number of goals scored per game increases and the number of 
goals conceded decreases, so that team score difference improves. 
 
 Table 1. A comparison of team performance under the old and the new coach  
 Points Score Difference Goals Scored Goals Conceded 
Old Coach 0.974 -0.489 0.968 1.457 
New Coach 1.099 -0.328 1.091 1.419 
 Notes: only teams who changed the coach within a season are considered 
 
Based on the data shown in Table 1, one would conclude that firing the coach of an 
underperforming team yields better results. However, results obtained on the field are 
influenced by a series of factors, which have to be taken into account, in order to have a reliable 
picture. One extremely important aspect is related to the fact that the old coach and the new 
coach do not play against the same opponents. For example, it is possible that the old coach 
started the season by playing against the toughest opponents, while the new coach faces weaker 
teams. In order to take into account these aspects, in the next Section we undertake an 
econometric analysis controlling for the quality differences among the opponents and for other 
determinants of team performance.  
 
3. Coach Change and Team Performance: Fixed-Effects Estimates 
In this Section, we evaluate the effects of changing the coach on team performance. The 
dependent variable is team performance measured, in the main specification, as the number of 
points earned by a team per game. Moreover, in alternative specifications, we measure team 
performance with the Score difference. Each game is considered twice: from the perspective of 
the home team and from the perspective of the visiting team. 
The variables we consider to explain team performance are the following: a dummy 
variable indicating if the game is played at home (Home); two alternative measures that capture 
the differences in the quality of opposing teams: the difference in the final ranking positions (in 
 6
the current season) between the considered team and its opponent (Ranking Difference); the 
difference in the points earned by the two teams until the present round (Points Difference)3.  
The dummy variable indicating whether the game is played at home should control for 
the well-known “home advantage”, which as shown by many studies is strong in sports and in 
soccer in particular, due to psychological reasons, social pressure by the crowd, possible 
favouritism of referees and so on (see Carmichael and Thomas, 2005, and Scoppa, 2008). 
The variables measuring differences in team quality should correct for any bias 
introduced by the fixed schedule of the play implying that the new and the old coach face 
different opposing teams and play home or away alternatively.  
Our variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating if a new coach is leading the 
team, replacing the old one in the current season (Coach Change). 
Performances of teams are obviously not directly comparable among them and, in 
addition, the performance of the same team is not comparable across seasons, because of 
changes in the team composition. Therefore, we estimate our model with fixed effects at team 
and seasonal level, that is we control for heterogeneity of teams inserting dummy variables for 
each team in each season. In this way, the estimate of the Coach Change effect is obtained by 
the comparison between the average performance of the team observed in matches played with 
the old coach and in matches played with the new coach (in the same season). 
Results of estimates are reported in Table 2. In column (1)-(3) we consider as a measure 
of team performance (the dependent variable) the number of points gained in each game. 
The effect of Coach Change is positive and strongly statistically significant in each 
specification. However, the magnitude is small: according to our estimates, playing with a new 
coach yields a team 2-3 points more every 10 matches.  
Control variables have the expected sign: estimates show that playing at home has a 
positive effect on team performance; the quality of opponent teams, measured as their respective 
ranking positions (column 1 and 3) or by points earned (column 2) has the expected impact on 
team performance: the higher the ranking difference (implying that the considered team is many 
positions below its opponent in the final ranking) the lower the points obtained, while the higher 
the difference in points (accumulated until the latest round) the higher the points obtained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Similar lagged variables are used in a number of previous studies to control for mean-reversion (see for 
example Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1986; Jacobs and Singell, 1993; Fizel and D’Itri, 1997; Audas et al. 
2006). 
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 Table 2. The effects of Coach Change on Team Performance. Fixed Effects Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Points Points Points Score 
Difference
Score 
Difference 
Score 
Difference 
Coach Change 0.225*** 0.339*** 0.131*** 0.261*** 0.427*** 0.196*** 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.050) (0.082) (0.087) (0.061) 
Home 0.602*** 0.611*** 0.603*** 0.790*** 0.803*** 0.790*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) 
Ranking Difference -0.062***  -0.058*** -0.084***  -0.077*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Points Difference  0.015***   0.022***  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Season 2004-05   -0.045   -0.038 
   (0.066)   (0.081) 
Season 2005-06   0.018   0.024 
   (0.068)   (0.083) 
Season 2006-07   0.012   0.032 
   (0.069)   (0.084) 
Season 2007-08   -0.016   0.002 
   (0.070)   (0.086) 
Constant 0.997*** 0.967*** 1.025*** -0.455*** -0.499*** -0.444*** 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.055) (0.037) (0.039) (0.068) 
Observations 3652 3652 3652 3652 3652 3652 
Number of Teams 98 98 30 98 98 30 
R-squared 0.151 0.086 0.159 0.176 0.101 0.180 
Number of Teams 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Notes: In columns (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variable is Points; in columns (4), (5) and (6) the 
dependent variable is Score Difference. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) include dummy variables for each 
team in each season, while columns (3) and (6) include dummy variables for each team and aggregate 
dummy variables for seasons.  The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, 
respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
  
In columns (3) we replicate the estimates of column (1) using team fixed effects not 
season-specific (but controlling for aggregate seasonal effects). Results are similar to previous 
specifications. 
In columns (4)-(6) we use as dependent variable the Score Difference instead of Points. 
Results are very similar to, respectively, column (1)-(3). 
In an alternative specification, we find slightly higher effects when we analyse the short 
time impact of coach turnover by focusing on results obtained by a team just in the four matches 
after replacement. For example, in a specification analogous to column (1), it emerges that 
playing with a new coach yields the team to gain 0.278 points per match in the four matches 
after replacement (results are not reported in the table, but available upon request). 
We have also experimented using as dependent variables two alternative measures of 
team performance (results are not reported to avoid cluttering the Table): the number of goals 
scored and the number of goals conceded (per game). These two measures are aimed at 
describing respectively the offensive and defensive capability of the team (see also Koning 
2003). We find that Coach Change has a significant and positive effect on Goals Scored and a 
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negative effect on Goals Conceded, implying that the new coach is able to improve both the 
offensive skills and the defensive skills of the team. 
As robustness exercise, we also run an ordered probit analysis considering as depended 
variable the final result of the game (Win, Draw and Loss) as an ordinal variable. Results are 
very similar to those shown in Table 2. 
 
5. Instrumental Variables Estimates for the Effects of Coach Change 
In the previous Section we have taken into account in our estimates problems deriving both 
from the fact that teams changing the coach tend to be of different quality and related to the 
quality of opponents, since, given the schedule of the season, the old and the new coach face 
different opponents. 
 We have also tried to control for the phenomenon of mean reversion in team 
performance using lagged match results (a similar strategy has been adopted for example by 
Audas et al. 2006,  Koning, 2002). 
Nevertheless, this does not allow to deal in a satisfactory way with endogeneity 
problems due to the fact that coaches are not fired randomly throughout the season, but 
dismissal decisions are usually the consequence of a spell of bad outcomes. Our model tries to 
explain whether firing the coach helps at obtaining a better performance compared to that 
obtained previously, but the occurrence of coach change depends itself on previous performance 
and then on the perceived improvement that may emerge. In addition, the team’s board has 
information about the coach characteristics (not included in our data), which are used in firing 
decisions. Therefore, our variable of interest, Coach Change, is correlated with the error term of 
the regression.  
Figure 1 represents the average performance of teams in matches before and after the 
change. It clearly shows that coach dismissals happen after a series of disappointing results. 
This is analogous to the “Ashenfelter dip phenomenon”, that is, selection for treatment is 
influenced by negative shocks to the performance.  
However, if teams are hit by a series of negative shocks they may recover after some 
period of time, simply as result of “regression to the mean”, independently if they have 
dismissed the coach or not.  
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Figure 1. Team Performance Before and After Coach Change 
 
 
In order to handle this problem, we use an instrumental variable for Coach Change and 
estimate our model through Two-Stages-Least-Squares. 
We need to find an instrumental variable Z which must comply with the two usual 
conditions: 1) the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable, that is 
( ) 0,_ ≠ZChangeCoachCov ; 2) the instrument must not affect team performance directly, for 
reasons beyond its influence on the variable of interest. It is required that the instrument is 
exogenous, that is ( ) 0, =εZCov .    
We believe that the number of matches to be played by a team before the end of the 
season (Remaining Matches) has both these characteristics. Firstly, the number of remaining 
matches in the season is a proxy for the residual length of the contract signed between the coach 
and the club. Since such contracts typically establish that in case of firing the dismissed coach 
has to be paid for the remaining part of the season, breaking a contract turns out to be more 
costly the higher the number of remaining matches (because the team has to pay both the new 
and the old coach during this period). From our First Stage regression, Remaining Matches is 
strongly negatively related to the probability of Coach Change. Secondly, the number of 
remaining matches should not affect directly team performance (for reasons unrelated to coach 
change), that is, our instrument is exogenous.  
Two-Stage Least Squares estimates are reported in Table 3, where we measure team 
performance both as Points (column 1) and as Score Difference (column 2). 
 Panel B of Table 3 shows the results from First Stage regressions. In the first stage the 
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instrumental variable strongly determines the probability of Coach Change. We are reassured 
that our instrument is not weak, since the F-statistic for the test of whether the instrument 
coefficient is equal to zero is well above the threshold value of 10 suggested by Stock and 
Watson (2003). 
 
Table 3. The effects of Coach Change on Team Performance using Remaining Matches as  
Instrumental Variable. 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Points Score Difference Points Score Difference 
Coach Change 0.030 -0.000 0.030 -0.000 
 (0.139) (0.170) (0.139) (0.171) 
Home 0.603*** 0.791*** 0.603*** 0.791*** 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.045) 
Ranking Difference -0.062*** -0.084*** -0.056*** -0.074*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 1.041*** -0.395*** 1.047*** -0.401*** 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.062) (0.076) 
Observations 3652 3652 3652 3652 
Number of Teams 98 98 98 98 
  
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
 
 Coach 
Change 
Coach 
Change 
Coach 
Change 
Coach 
Change 
Remaining matches -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Home 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ranking Difference -0.000 -0.000 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Season 2004-0005   0.080*** 0.080*** 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Season 2005-0006   0.005 0.005 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Season 2006-0007   -0.009 -0.009 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Season 2007-0008   0.069*** 0.069*** 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 3652 3652 3652 3652 
Number of Teams 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.232 
Notes: Panel A reports the Two-Stage Least Squares estimates, instrumenting Coach Change using Remaining matches. 
Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets. 
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents Two Stage Least Squares estimates. Our results show that, 
when instrumented, Coach Change is not statistically significant (neither when team 
performance is measured with Points, nor when performance is measured with Score 
Difference). 
According to our estimates, once endogeneity problems are handled, replacing badly 
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performing coaches within the season does not suffice to improve the performance of a team4.  
In columns (3) and (4) we replicate the estimates of column (1) and (2) using team fixed 
effects not season-specific. Again, we do not find any significant effect of coach replacement on 
team performance.  
Similar results are obtained also when we investigate the effect of coach turnover 
respectively on the offensive and defensive skills of the team.   
We find instead a negative effect when we analyse the short time impact of coach 
turnover. From IV estimates it emerges a negative and statistically significant (at 10% level) 
effect when we consider as dependent variable Points and a negative but not statistically 
significant effect when we measure performance as Score Difference (estimates are available 
upon request). This result may be interpreted in relation to the loss of specific human capital 
that takes place once the old coach is dismissed: in fact it may take time for a new manager to 
acquire all the relevant information and to “take charge” (see Rowe et al., 2005). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Managers dismissals are quite frequent both in firms and in sport teams. However, the evidence 
on the effects of these managerial replacement decisions is not clear. Nor the business literature 
neither analysis based on sport data come out with univocal results. While a number of studies 
show a positive results other works do not find any statistically significant effect or find indeed 
negative effects. 
 Earlier analysis were based on simple econometric models, which were not able to take 
into account some relevant econometric problems related to the fact that we do not observe the 
same team playing at the same point in time with the old and the new coach. More recently 
empirical studies have undertaken a number of estimation strategies to handle these problems.  
 This paper adds to this literature and tries to provide some additional evidence on the 
effect of coach replacement, focusing on the major Italian soccer league (“Serie A”), using an 
instrumental variable approach.  
 From our analysis it emerges that endogeneity problems can lead to biased conclusions 
on the effect of coach replacement. In fact, when we estimate the impact of coach change with 
fixed effects at team and seasonal level, it emerges a positive statistically significant effect 
(even if small), which vanishes when we control for endogeneity problems in coach 
replacement. According to our Two-Stages Least-Square estimates, in which we use as an 
                                                     
4 We have also dealt with mean reversion using an alternative approach which consists in excluding from 
the analysis match results for a number of weeks prior to coach changes. We have experimented 
excluding results of the 4 weeks prior to manager forced resignations. Our results suggest that coach 
turnover does not produce any statistically significant positive effect on team performance (the coefficient 
on our variable of interest is positive, but statistically insignificant).   
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instrument for coach forced resignation the number of matches to be played by the team before 
the end of the season, playing with a new coach does not produce any statistically significant 
effect on team performance.  
 This finding confirms results obtained by some recent studies (Bruinshoofd and Ter 
Weel, 2003, Balduck and Buelens, 2007) and suggests that the firing of a coach has to be 
explained in relation to other reasons rather than for the expected improvement in team 
performance. For example, team boards may over-estimate their own ability to undertake 
optimal replacement decisions, or as suggested by the scapegoating theory, firing the coach may 
represent a convenient mean for owners of placating frustrated stakeholders and displacing 
blame for the poor performance away from themselves. 
 A relevant question is whether these results can be generalized to other organizational 
structures, such as firms. While, on the one hand, it is important to consider that they pertain to 
team sports, which are characterised by some particular features and then it is not possible to 
derive general conclusions, on the other hand, they suggest that the natural tendency for mean 
reversion has to been taken seriously into account in order to avoid misleading conclusions on 
the effect of managerial turnover on organizational performance.  
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